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REIMAGINING REGULATORY APPROACHES: ON THE 




This article calls for a reimagining of regulatory approaches to health research. It is 
argued that an essential first step of such a reimagining involves the development of a 
deeper understanding of the diverse and indispensable roles which principles can play 
as regulatory decision-making aids. This topic merits attention given the fact that we 
perpetually rely upon principles without really considering what it is we are asking 
principles to do within the regulatory environment. In particular, this paper considers 
how principles can assist in addressing key challenges which new technologies pose 
to regulation, as well as the relationships that might exist between principles and rules 
in such instances.  The discussion here takes place against the backdrop of the 
complex and evolving landscape of the governance of the reuse of data for health 
research. At the same time, the contributions in this article can be of real value to 
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Principles and rules are omnipresent; they feature within every aspect of our lives. 
From a regulatory perspective, they are indispensable tools through which behaviour 
can be regulated. A plethora of legislative provisions and guiding principles are 
perpetually thrust upon us from legislators, professional bodies, and organisations 
attempting to govern the ways in which we live. When new regulations are 
introduced, whether in the form of principles and/or rules, what is most often the topic 
of analysis is the content which they carry rather than consideration of their 
appropriateness as regulatory mechanisms for achieving a desired end. 
Significant contributions have been made towards understanding the nature and utility 
of principles, often eminating from legal jurisprudential literature where their 
respective merits and limitations have been layed out, most notably by influential 
authors such as Herbert Hart,1 Ronald Dworkin,2 and Joseph Raz.3 Robert Alexy has 
also considered the nature of and (purported) distinctions between rules and 
principles. Whilst Alexy argues that both rules and principles are norms, they are, he 
contends, qualtitatively different. Rules, according to Alexy are either valid or not. In 
contrast, principles are optimization requirements which can be fulfilled to varying 
degrees. 4  
Other more recent contributions on rules and principles, specifically around 
‘regulation’, have come from authors such as Julia Black, who has discussed the need 
for a shift from rule to principle-based-regulation (PBR).5 And, while Black’s 
discussions take place within the context of the UK financial sector, PBR has also 
been transplanted to other disciplines, including the health setting.6 Within bioethics, 
principle-based decision-making is consistently evoked when justifying a given stance 
on an ethical dilemma, with Beauchamp and Childress’s Four Principles7 frequently 
forming the framework within which such debates take place. The latter authors have 
sought to  defend the value of their principlist approach against criticisms8 around the 
vague and abstract nature of principles. Despite these important contributions around 
how we conceptualise principles and how we might use them in regulation, we have 
                                                
1 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
2 R Dworkin, “The Model of Rules” (1967) 35 The University of Chicago Law Review 14-46. 
3 J Raz, “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972), 81The Yale Law Journal, 823-854. 
4 R Alexy, ‘The Structure of Constitutional Rights Norms’ in A Theory of Constitutional Rights p. 44-
110 (Oxford University Press: Oxford) (2002) (Translated by Julien Rivers) 
5 J Black, “The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation”, (LSE Law Society and Economy 
Working Papers 17/2010 2010); J Black, M Hopper and C Band, “Making a success of Principles-
based regulation” (2007) 13 Law and Financial Markets Review. 
6 S Devaney, “Regulate to Innovate: Principles-Based Regulation of Stem Cell Research” (2011) 11 
Medical Law International 53-68; G Laurie and N Sethi, “Towards Principles-Based Approaches to 
Governance of Health-Related Research Using Personal Data” (2013) 1 European Journal of Risk 
Regulation 43-57. 
7 T Beauchamp and J Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2013). 
8 See for example B Gert, C Culver and D Clouser, Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1997).   
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thus far predominantly focussed our attention on the content of such principles,9 or on 
whether one principle is more helpful than another principle or other principles,10 or 
whether a principle is more useful than a rule11 (or vice versa) for regulatory decision-
making purposes. Whilst this article draws upon some of the key literatures 
mentioned above, the purpose of the discussion here is not to consider the long-
standing debates about how to distinguish rules and principles. Rather, it will consider 
the nature of principles which may, in turn, shed light on those other debates. 
There has been a lack of adequate reflection upon the different and yet 
complementary functions which principles in particular might offer us as regulatory 
tools, and this paper strives to explore some of these functions. Reflecting upon the 
contributions of principles separately from the distractions of trying to argue whether 
they are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than rules, and, instead, considering them as 
complimentary to rules can also be of real value to contemporary governance.  
Better understanding the relationship between principles and rules can aid regulators 
in adopting regulatory approaches which make the most of both, as co-existing within 
a complementary, symbiotic relationship whereby each can tend to the regulatory 
gaps which the other leaves. Thus, the contribution of this paper lies in taking us 
beyond discussions which have preceded it: discussions which lack reflection of the 
range of functions of principles and how they can be used alongside rules. Hitherto, 
we have tended to dichotomise rules and principles-based regulation. This paper takes 
a first step in transporting us away from dichotomy and towards harmony, advancing 
a more constructive, complementary approach of principles and rules within 
regulation. Understanding the different functions (and limitations) of principles can 
encourage regulators not only to design, but also to employ them in an efficient and 
appropriate manner. This can enable ‘conscious’ use of principles. 
The discussion in this article takes place against the backdrop of health research 
regulation, albeit that the arguments and ultimate conclusions are of wider 
application. This field of enquiry provides a perfect example of the challenges that 
come with regulating a complex and constantly evolving landscape; it is one which 
implicates a diverse range of stakeholders who must negotiate an extensive range of 
legislative and ethical considerations. Particular challenges emerge because of the 
                                                
9 See for example: D Bromwich, A Rid, “Can informed consent to research be adapted to risk?” (2014) 
0 J Med Ethics 1–8 (online first) doi:10.1136/medethics-2013-101912; M Taylor, ‘Privacy’ in Genetic 
Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy Protection (2012) Cambridge University Press, 
13-40. 
10 C T Di Iorio, F Carinci1 and J Oderkirk, “Health research and systems’ governance are at risk: 
should the right to data protection override health?” (2014) 40 J Med Ethics 488-492; D Buchanan, 
“Autonomy, Paternalism, and Justice: Ethical Priorities in Public Health” (2008) 98 Am J Public 
Health, 15–21. R Gillon, “Ethics needs principles – four can encompass the rest – and respect for 
autonomy should be ‘first among equals’” (2003) 29 J Med Ethics 307–312. 
11 J Black, The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation, (LSE Law Society and Economy 
Working Papers 17/2010 2010); J Black, M Hopper and C Band, “Making a success of Principles-
based regulation”, 13 Law and Financial Markets Review (2007), at p.191; S Arjoon, “Striking a 
Balance Between Rules and Principles-based Approaches for Effective Governance: A Risk-based 
Approach” 68 Journal of Business Ethics (2006), 53, 65. 
(2015) 12:2 SCRIPTed 
 
94 
rapid pace at which new health technologies continue to develop, the inability of the 
law to keep up,12 and the new ethical and legal dilemmas that consequently arise.  
The first part of this paper briefly deals with definitions of principles and rules. Next, 
the prevalence of principles within health research regulation is considered, 
highlighting why this specific area of regulation is particularly complex. The 
discussion also illustrates the need to consider principles and rules as complementary, 
rather than mutually-exclusive, or even antagonistic, regulatory tools.  Finally, the 
point is made that no matter how well or ‘consciously’ employed, principles (and 
rules) cannot tend to all of the challenges of regulation: Great importance lies in 
engendering a culture of confidence, trust and engagement with key stakeholders. A 
reimagining of regulatory approaches through better understanding principles, as laid 
out within this paper, can, however, take us some of the way. 
 
2. Principles, rules and grey areas : a brief introduction 
2.1 Principles 
Principles can mean different things to different people in different contexts. The need 
to ‘unpack’ these different understandings, and the consequences of adopting one 
meaning over others is central to the contribution of this piece. It becomes evident 
from this paper that the different purposes that principles can serve further highlights 
the nuances that exist within the different dimensions of what we refer to as 
‘principles’. It is argued that what a principle ‘is’ is inextricably linked to what 
principles can be called upon to do.  Defining principles from the outset is a difficult 
undertaking, but, nonetheless one which is briefly considered in order to frame the 
discussion.  
An intentionally broad definition of ‘principle’ or ‘principles’ has been adopted 
within this paper. This is due to the fact that, as stated above, ‘principle’ can mean 
different things to different people. 13  This is not only in terms of interpreting the 
content of principles, but equally at a more abstract level with regards to what a 
principle ‘is’. A principle can constitute an ethical value for consideration, such as the 
principle of beneficence, which, in the medical context, implies that actions taken by 
physicians should benefit their patients. Alternatively, a principle can be 
conceptualised as a legal principle. For example, the precautionary principle 
commonly appears within discussions around research and risk:  
“At its most basic, the precautionary principle is a principle of public 
decision making that requires decision makers in cases where there are 
                                                
12 See for example L Bennett Moses, “Recurring Dilemmas: the Law’s Race to Keep Up with 
Technological Change” (2007) 7 University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology and Policy 239-
285. 
13 K Wildes, “Principles, Rules, Duties and Babel: Bioethics in the Face of Postmodernity” (1992) 17 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 483-485, at 484. 
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‘threats’ of environmental or health harm not to use ‘lack of full scientific 
uncertainty’ as a reason for not taking measures to prevent such harm”.14  
In yet other contexts, principles feature frequently within professional guidelines, akin 
to standards of practice, and often such principles can appear, confusingly, to be just 
as prescriptive as rules. The General Medical Council, for example, expects registered 
doctors in the UK to abide by its Principles of Good Research Practice.15 It is 
precisely because of the diverse manner in which principles are characterised or 
manifest, that an inclusive conceptualisation of principles is offered here.  
In terms of key features of principles, again, there is no fixed list. A typical ‘portrait’ 
of principles regarding the form they take might include that they are high-level, 
vague, abstract, broad iterations of values or norms.16  In reality this is not always the 
case. Appeals are often made to ‘principles’ which are highly prescriptive in laying 
out specific instruction on what to do in a specific situation. Consider, for example, 
the Data Protection Principles included within the European Data Protection 
Directive17 (and its UK embodiment, the Data Protection Act 1998). The eighth 
principle reads:  
Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the 
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate 
level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to 
the processing of personal data.18 
This is rather a specific prescription on how data are to be processed (or not). These 
“principles” are accompanied by very harsh legal sanctions if they are not respected. 
Adding a further layer of complexity, it is argued below that the Data Protection 
Principles are not principles per se but rather that they are more akin to rules.  
It follows that, given the diverse incarnations that principles take, there is some 
reluctance and difficulty in adopting any one specific definition of a principle. 
Furthermore, fixating upon definitions is unhelpful for the purposes of this particular 
discussion which strives to shed light on the nuances that exist around our deployment 
of principles in a range of contexts.  For those that would, nonetheless, push for a 
definition, then Robert Alexy provides a helpful basic starting point in defining 
principles as follows: 
Principles are norms which require that something be realized to the greatest 
extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. Principles are 
                                                
14 E Fisher, J Jones and R Schomberg (eds), Implementing the Precautionary Principles: Perspectives 
and Prospects, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006) at 2. 
15 General Medical Council, Good practice in research: Principles of good research practice, (2013). 
16 See for example: K., Danner Clouser, K., and Gert, B., “A Critique of Principlism”, (1990) 15 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 219-236; T Beauchamp and J Childress, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) and Alexy, note 4 above. 
17 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data.  
18 UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
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optimization requirements, characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied 
to varying degrees.19  
Additionally, principles might typically be described as broad iterations of a value or 
set of values demanding consideration during decision-making. As we will come to 
see later in this article, this feature of principles as an embodiment of values can serve 
a protective function with regards to safeguarding against abuse of power or 
deliberate misinterpretation of rules. 
Although the primary focus of this paper is not centred around reaching an ultimate, 
all-encompassing definition of principles, in listing pros and cons of principles, or on 
assessing different methodologies for their application, it is still worthwhile noting 
that principles have endured several recurring key criticisms. Such criticisms are often 
based on their vague nature and the difficulties in actually applying them in the 
decision-making context. In response to the vague nature of principles, appeals are 
often made to specification,20 defined as the process of ‘reducing the 
indeterminateness of abstract norms and providing them with action-guiding 
content’.21  Another key challenge with principles is that conflict can occur between 
different principles; balancing is often cited as a method of choosing which principle 
to apply when such conflict arises. Balancing can, however, be a problematic concept. 
It implies that different principles are commensurate i.e. that they can each be 
assigned weights.22 It is argued that what is actually taking place is the prioritisation 
of one principle over another. This need not be problematic. In different situations, 
different principles will be more important than others. Rather than developing 
methodology which must tend to the vulnerabilities which principles may carry, the 
contribution being made here seeks to offer a deeper understanding of some of the 
different ways in which principles can be employed within the regulatory sphere.  
 
2.1.2 Defining Rules 
“Rules” are also referred to throughout this paper. As with principles, nuances can 
exist within different conceptualisations of rules, particularly when these come in the 
form of legislation. For example, the distinction is often made between “hard” and 
“soft” law whereby the former implies enforceability and rigidity, whereas the latter 
often lacks this.23 In contrast with principles, key terms used within a portrait of rules 
                                                
19 Alexy, see note 4 above, 47-48. 
20  H Richardson, “Specifying, Balancing, and Interpreting Bioethical Principles” (2000) 25 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 285-307, at 286. 
21 T Beauchamp, “Methods and Principles of Biomedical Ethics” (2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 
269-274, at 269. 
22 See note 20 above. 
23 Legal Theory Lexicon, “All the concepts that fit” (2015) available at 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le_3.html (accessed 12 Aug 
2013); L Barani, “Hard and Soft Law in the European Union: The Case of Social Policy and the Open 
Method of Coordination” (2006) available at https://www.wiso.uni-
hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/ConWeb_Papers/conweb2-2006.pdf (accessed 7th Jan 
2015). 
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regarding the form they take would typically include rigid, prescriptive and specific.24 
Again, this is not a consistent set of traits for rules. A well-known Hartian observation 
on rules centres on the idea of a core and a penumbra. Within the core, there is 
relative certainty around the meaning of or language used in a rule, however, beyond 
this core exists a penumbra where the meaning of the rule is indeterminate and thus 
open to interpretation, demanding the exercise of discretion.25 Thus, rules can also be 
articulated in broad and vague terms, with which we are unable to avoid the inevitable 
room for interpretation and, as Hart put it, the “open texture” that they leave.26  At the 
very least, Alexy’s conceptualization of rules as norms which are either valid or 
invalid is helpful; the author suggests that rules can either be fulfilled or not, which 
gives them a prima facie definitive nature: 
rules are norms which are always either fulfilled or not. If a rule validly 
applies, then the requirement is to do exactly what it says, neither more nor 
less. In this way rules contain fixed points in the field of the factually and 
legally possible. .27 
 This is in contrast to principles which, as considered above, can be fulfilled to 
varying degrees. 
In terms of application of rules, both Dworkin’s and Alexy’s conceptualization of 
rules is that they are applicable in an “all-or-nothing” fashion28 suggesting that 
(barring an exception to a rule) either a rule is engaged in a given scenario or it is not. 
As with principles, conflict between rules can also occur. Braithwaite observes that: 
“[r]ules look more certain when they stand alone; uncertainty is crafted in the 
juxtaposition with other rules.”29Often, where new technologies are at play, more than 
one rule is potentially engaged at the same time. Alexy suggests that in the case of 
inter-rule conflict one of the competing rules is declared invalid. Where conflict might 
arise between different sets of rules, resolution can be achieved by creating a 
hierarchy between sets of rules, as is the case with EU and national laws of EU 
Member States. Where no such hierarchy exists, resolving inter-rule conflict can still 
be problematic.30 Again, assessing the weaknesses of rules is not the focus of this 
paper, but rather, the points above are mentioned in order to emphasize that rules and 
principles are both open to criticism and that there can be overlap in some of their 
“characteristics”, a point which is explored next. 
                                                
24 S. Arjoon, “Striking a Balance Between Rules and Principles-based Approaches for Effective 
Governance: A Risk-based Approach” (2006) 68 Journal of Business Ethics 53-82, at 65; and J. 
Braithwaite, “Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty” (2002) 27 Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 47-82; T Beauchamp and J Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Fifth Edition, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 13. 
25 See note 1 above. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Alexy, note 4 above.  
28 M Redondo, “Legal Reasons: Between Universalism and Particularism” (2005) 2 Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 47-68.  
29 See for example Braithwaite, note 24 above.  
30 R Michaels and J. Paulwelyn, “Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws: Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of Public International Law” Symposium: International Law and Global Public Goods, 
(2012) 22 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L 349 – 376.  




2.1.3 Accepting grey areas 
The preceeding sections stressed that defining principles and rules is not an easy 
undertaking. Whilst Joseph Raz has argued that the difference between rules and 
principles lies in specificity:  “[r]ules prescribe relatively specific acts; principles  
prescribe highly unspecific actions”31, other scholars offer alternative views on how 
the two are differentiated.  
Alexy, for example, as mentioned above, suggests that principles are “optimization 
requirements”32 which can be satisfied to different degrees whereas rules can either be 
fulfilled or not. He has considered three different theses around the distinction 
between rules and principles. The first distinction hypothesis emphasises the different 
classifications of rules and principles based upon their characteristics.33 As we have 
considered thus far though, rules and principles can at times share the same 
characteristics and thus classification is not always helpful. The second thesis 
described by Alexy is ‘a distinction of degree’ i.e. principles are fulfilled to varying 
degrees and rules are more binary: they are either applicable or not.34 This thesis, 
whilst closer to Alexy’s preferred conceptualisation, is lacking in an important 
nuance.  Alexy stresses that the distinction between rules and principles is not 
merely35 about the degree to which they can be fulfilled but rather, rules and 
principles differ on a ‘qualitiative’ basis.36  
At the same time, as considered above, reaching wide-spread agreement on precisely 
what this qualitative difference is remains difficult; distinguisihing clearly between 
rules and principles is not straightforward. Rules and principles can share common 
characteristics (both in the sense of comparing rules to rule, principles to principles 
and rules to principles).  Indeed, Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblances’ might be a 
more realistic, less ambitious approach to capturing characterisations of rules and 
principles.37 We have considered above that both rules and principles suffer from the 
challenges of conflict. The ways in which conflict can be resolved, however, 
supposedly differs depending upon whether we are dealing with a rule or a principle: 
 
If two principles compete, for example if one principle prohibits something 
and another permits it, the one of the principles must be outweighed. This 
means neither that the outweighed principle is invalid nor that it has to have an 
exception built into it. On the contrary, the outweighed principles may itself 
outweigh the other principle in certain circumstances…That is what is meant 
when it is said that principles have different weights in different cases and that 
the more important principle on the facts of the case takes precedence. 
                                                
31 See note 3 above. 
32 Alexy, note 4 above, at, 46-48. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Emphasis added. 
36 Alexy, note 4 above.  
37 L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Basil Blackwell Ltd, (Oxford: 1958).  
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Conflicts of rules are played out at the level of validity; since only valid 
principles can compete, competitions between principles are played out in the 
dimension of weight instead.38 
 
In contrast, in the case of conflict between rules, only two means of resolution are 
suggested by Alexy. Either an exception is read into a rule, or one of the rules must be 
declared invalid.39  
Rather than fixating upon the different theories about how rules and principles differ 
it might be a more helpful endeavour to move beyond traditional dichotomizations of 
rules and principles which strive to capture their distinctions. Rather, as it is argued 
here, view rules and principles as co-existing upon a spectrum. Viewing these 
regulatory tools on a spectrum acknowledges the blurred lines that can exist between 
them, and goes some way towards explaining why rules can be confused with 
principles and vice versa. Of course, as with any spectrum, there will be extremes 
where distinctions are more straight-forward and where the distinctions considered 
above may be more useful. But what about the grey area?   
Goodin adopts a loose conception of rules and collapses the distinction between 
principles and rules, viewing them as at opposite ends of a continuum: “principle[s] is 
to rule as plan is to blueprint”. 40   Thus, rules are viewed as merely more detailed 
principles. Goodin’s analysis, whilst it acknowledges a relationship between rules and 
principles, perhaps goes too far in equating rules as merely more detailed iterations of 
principles. It is one thing to say that both are interconnected, indeed many rules might 
be based on underlying principles (for example, requirements to obtain consent before 
procesisng personal data can be considered an underlying manifestation of the 
principle of respect for autonomy) but an entirely different argument emerges when 
both rules and principles are equated. Such an approach negates the different 
functions that principles in particular can play. The contribution here accepts both 
Alexy’s differentiation between rules and principles and Goodin’s suggestion of a 
continuum, but the purpose of this paper is neither to discuss the particulars of such a 
continuum nor to focus on perpetuating the differences between rules and principles 
per se. Rather the contribution here aims to consider the nature of principles within 
that continuum, and thus focus is placed on unpacking the different funcitons which 
principles can play which, in turn, can contribute towards the wider discussion on the 
nature of rules and principles. It is only though better understanding some of the 
functions which principles can play that we can start to explore more deeply the grey 
area which clearly exists, thus fleshing out the continuum upon which rules and 
principles can co-exist. A task to which we can now turn. 
 
                                                
38 Alexy note 4 above, at 50.  
39 The example offered by Alexy is of rule 1 (R1) do not leave the classroom until the bell rings and 
rule 2 (R2) leave the classroom immediately when the fire alarm rings. In this case, an exception must 
be read-in to the rule so that noone must leave the classrom before the bell unless the fire alarm rings, 
ibid at 48.  
40 R Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1982) chpt 4. 
Goodin uses the language of ‘continuum’ to describe the relationship between rules and principles. 
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3.  Challenges of new technologies in the context of health research regulation 
 
A mere glance at the plethora of legislation, professional guidance, and academic 
literatures around health research regulation uncovers a variety of principles aimed at 
fulfilling a variety of different functions. Consider, for example, the principles 
included within the Nuremberg Code,41 reputed by some to be “the most important 
document in the history of the ethics of medical research”.42 The 10 principles within 
the Code remain core tenets of ethical research conduct over the 60+ years since their 
introduction. Similarly, the Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research included within the Belmont Report43 in the United 
States serve to underpin the parameters within which biomedical and behavioural 
human research experimentation should be conducted. They offer a widely used set of 
ethical principles according to which both research applicants and Research Ethics 
Committees/Institutional Review Boards should assess the ethical robustness of 
research applications involving human participants.44 In the United Kingdom, the 
major funding bodies such as the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust 
and professional bodies like the General Medical Council and the British Medical 
Association have released numerous guidelines around research conduct, and these 
are updated on a frequent basis. Relatedly, the four principles of justice, autonomy, 
beneficence and non-maleficence as advanced by Beauchamp and Childress45 feature 
extensively (and almost automatically) within much bioethical discourse. Numerous 
further examples of the prevalence of principles can be observed by conducting a 
brief audit of key regulatory instruments not only within health, but also in other 
regulatory settings, such as the financial,46 business,47 and environmental sectors.48 
The important point is that appeals are made to the notion of “principles” on a daily 
basis and in a wide range of settings to govern a variety of activities that impact our 
lives. And yet, despite the integral spaces that they occupy, we fail to reflect 
adequately upon the different ways in which these appeals to principles are being 
made. A simple yet important question then follows: how do we know that we are 
using principles effectively when we fail to reflect upon the different ways in which 
                                                
41 The Nuremberg Code (1947). 
42 E Shuster, “Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code” (1997) 337 New England 
Journal of Medicine 1436-1440. 
43 Belmont	   Report:	   Ethical	   Principles	   and	   Guidelines	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Subjects	   of	  Research,	  Report	  of	  the	  National	  Commission	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Subjects	  of	  Biomedical	  and	  Behavioral	  Research	  (1979). 
44 T Beauchamp, “The Belmont Report” E Emanuel et al. (eds) The Oxford Textbook of Clinical 
Research Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
45 Beauchamp and Childress, see note 7 above. 
46 A. Kern and N. Moloney, Law Reform and Financial Markets (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing: 2011) at p. 8; J. Black, “The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation” (LSE Law 
Society and Economy Working Papers 17/2010 2010). 
47 See for example: HM Government, ‘Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights’ (2013). 
48 K Kamminga, "Principles of international environmental law." Environmental policy in an 
international context 1 (1995): 111-131. 
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we might use them? Put otherwise, are we are relying on principles “unconsciously”? 
If so, why? Might it be that we are misusing principles when, in fact, they are not the 
optimal regulatory mechanism to meet a desired end? Equally so, it might be that we 
are overly-reliant upon alternative regulatory mechanisms (such as rules) when, in 
fact, a desired end could be met much more effectively through the (alternative or 
additional) deployment of principles. 
These questions are important when we consider the significant role which regulation 
must play in advancing and governing scientifically sound and ethically robust health 
research. Health research, by its very nature, engages a host of issues; legal, ethical 
and social. It appeals to questions on justice, autonomy, privacy, consent, 
confidentiality, trust, the public interest, solidarity, and commercialisation to name a 
few. It demands identification of the core values at stake, and, as we come to see later 
in this paper, through their dialogical nature, principles can perform this function. 
Regulation also necessitates ongoing reflection upon how to balance/accommodate 
these interests, especially given that they can often conflict. From a legislative 
perspective, and often incorporating these ethical considerations, health research 
touches upon several fundamental rights.49 Further, numerous international, 
European50 and domestic legislative instruments are engaged,51 accompanied of 
course by professional and organisational guidelines and standards. 
If we consider the regulation of health record use in genomic research, it was 
suggested that in the UK alone, this “…is affected by 43 relevant pieces of legislation. 
There were 12 sets of relevant standards and 8 professional codes of conduct. What 
this has bred is a culture of caution, confusion, uncertainty and inconsistency”.52 This 
is in relation to just one EU Member State, on one aspect of health record use, which, 
in turn, constitutes just one area of health research. It is easy, then, to sympathise with 
regulators and regulatees alike who must respectively construct and self-navigate 
these regulatory environments which are often described as piecemeal, over-
burdensome, and disproportionate.53  
One reason that health research in itself is a particularly complex area is, of course, 
because of the high (and sensitive) stakes involved. Health research can lead to 
scientific discoveries with the potential to benefit many members within a population, 
not only in terms of immediate or direct health benefits to individuals, but also in the 
development of new procedures and technologies for other population groups and for 
future generations. Given the considerable global health demands of ageing 
                                                
49 For example, the right to health is included within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural. Research participant rights are enshrined 
within instruments such as the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. 
50 For an interesting discussion on norms and standards of health law in Europe, see N Hoppe, “On the 
Europeanization of Health Law” (editorial), (2010) 17 European Journal of Health Law 323-328. 
51 Such as the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14) 
52 House of Lords Science & Technology Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2008–09: Genomic 
Medicine (London: Stationary Office, 2009) para 6.15. 
53 Academy of Medical Sciences, Personal data for public good: using health information in medical 
research (2011); Academy of Medical Sciences, A new pathway for the regulation and governance of 
health research (2012); R Thomas and T Walport, Data Sharing Review Report (2008). 
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populations,54 and the alarming rates at which non-communicable diseases are 
increasing,55 the pressure is on to provide solutions which can relieve the current (and 
anticipated) healthcare demands which both national health systems and the 
international community must face.  
It is important to remember too that new technologies not only introduce the promise 
of new solutions and improvements in health but additionally, they pose new risks. 
Such risks are often difficult to measure depending upon the technology or procedure 
in question. Risks can include: physical harm, psychological harm, privacy violations, 
distrust within doctor-patient and participant-researcher relationships, exploitation, 
and other harms, such as reputational damage to healthcare providers and institutions. 
The introduction of new technologies necessitates deliberation over new previously 
unforeseen ethical, legal and social issues,56 such as those introduced by novel neuro-
technologies57 and implantable devices.58 Similarly, Mitochondrial DNA 
technologies,59 and some stem cell therapies which are currently at research stage, 
also raise important questions prior to their introduction as everyday technological 
interventions. As such, regulatees often find themselves traversing uncharted 
territories where the law does not provide clear answers on “what to do”. Indeed, the 
failure of the law to keep up with the rapid pace at which technology develops is 
commonly acknowledged60 not only within, but also beyond the health setting.61  
Thus, within the regulation of health research, numerous challenges appear. These 
challenges cannot be overcome by legislation (often in the form of rules) alone which 
can be restrictive. Further below, we consider how rules can tend to increase the over 
or under-inclusiveness of activities as a result of technological change, and how 
principles can help to avoid this. Additionally, we consider how principles can help to 
tend to another risk associated with new technology: that of abuse of powers and 
deliberate misinterpretation of pre-existing rules. The time has come to explore more 
deeply just how principles can be facilitative in regulatory terms.  
 
Electronic health records: a pertinent case-study 
                                                
54 See for example:  S Harmon and K Chen, “Medical Research Data-Sharing: The ‘Public Good’ and 
Vulnerable Groups” (2012) 20 Med Law Rev 516-539, E. Rynning, “The Ageing Populations of 
Europe: Implications for Health Systems and Patients’ Rights” (2008) 15 Euro J Health Law 297-306. 
55 R Beaglehole and D Yach, “Globalisation and the prevention and control of non-communicable 
disease: the neglected chronic diseases of adults” (2003) 362 The Lancet 903-908. 
56 G Marchant, A Meyer and M Scanlon, “Regulatory Frontiers: Integrating Social and Ethical 
Concerns Into Regulatory Decision-Making for Emerging Technologies” (2010) 11 Minn J. L. Sci & 
Tech 345-363. 
57 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Novel neurotechnologies: intervening in the brain’ (2013). 
58 W H Maisel, “Safety Issues Involving Medical Devices Implications of Recent Implantable 
Cardioverter-Defibrillator Malfunctions”, (2005) 294 Journal of the American Medical Association, 
955-958.  
59 F Baylis, “The ethics of creating children with three genetic parents” (2013) 26 Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online 531-534. 
60 See for example Bennet-Moses, note 12 above. 
61 See more generally: R Brownsword and M Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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The regulation of health research which makes use of electronic health records 
(EHRs) provides a particularly pertinent backdrop against which to consider just how 
principles can be facilitative. New technological developments around how data can 
be collected, stored, shared and reused have major impacts on what we are able to do 
with such data. We have come a long way since Dunn’s seminal article which first 
alluded to record linkage.62   The process of analysing one or more data sets together 
is now commonly referred to as “data linkage”, it “…brings together information 
from two or more records from independent sources that are perceived to belong to 
the same individual, family, event or place”.63 It has experienced exponential growth, 
with many of these changes being attributed to the introduction of new technologies.  
In many countries today, and in recognition of the value which can be gleamed from 
EHRs, initiatives are underway in order to electronically document individual health 
information - including hospital episodes, vaccination records and medications 
prescribed - with attempts to  document this information all the way through from 
birth to death.64 Alongside the introduction of EHRs, new technological advances 
have meant that vast amounts of data can be collated, linked and analysed in a short 
space of time.65 “Big Data” has become a ubiquitous term.66 Data linkage is also a 
particularly cost-effective technology.67 Population-level databases are now 
commonly used to monitor public health68and to conduct research. There are currently 
numerous health informatics initiatives which link together various types of data, in 
line with the UK’s Open Data Strategy69 combining data not only at a national,70 but 
                                                
62 H. Dunn, “Record Linkage” (1946) 36 American Journal of Public Health 1412-1416. See also the 
work of William Farr in the 1800s. See A. Langmuir, “William Farr: Founder of Modern Concepts of 
Surveillance” (1976) 5 Int Journ Epid 13-18. 
63 E. Brook, D. Rosman and C. Holman, “Public good though data linkage: measuring research outputs 
from the Western Australian Data Linkage System” (2008) 32 Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Public Health 19-23. 
64 See for example Scottish Government, “The use of the CHI (Community Health Index) to support 
integrated care across the NHS in Scotland” (2013). 
 
65 M. Jaro, “Probabilistic linkage of large public health data files” (1995) 14 Statistics in Medicine 491-
498.  
66 For a concise overview of Big Data and related trends, see: HM Government Horizon Scanning 
Programme, ‘Emerging Technologies: Big Data’ (2014) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389095/Horizon_Scanni
ng_-_Emerging_Technologies_Big_Data_report_1.pdf (accessed 6th Jan 2015). 
67 W. Lowrance, “Learning from Experience: Privacy and the Secondary Use of Data in Health 
Research” Report for The Nuffield Trust (2002) at 6. 
68 See for example, Western Australian approaches: E. Brook, D. Rosman and C. Holman, “Public 
good though data linkage: measuring research outputs from the Western Australian Data Linkage 
System” (2008) 32 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 19-23. 
69 HM Government, Open Data White Paper: Unleashing the Potential, Cm 8353 (2012). 
70 See for example: The University of Manchester, “Centre for Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug 
Safety”. Retrieved 26 March 2014, www.pharmacy.manchester.ac.uk/cpds; Agencia Española de 
medicamentos y productos sanitaros (The Spanish Medicines Agency). Retrieved 26 March 2014, 
www.aemps.gob.es/en/home.htm; Agence nationale de sécurité du medicament et des produits de santé 
(2015) available at http://ansm.sante.fr/L-ANSM2/Une-agence-d-expertise/L-ANSM-agence-d-
evaluation-d-expertise-et-de-decision/(offset)/0 (accessed 7th Jan 2015). 
(2015) 12:2 SCRIPTed 
 
104 
also European,71 and global level. Beyond health-health data linkage, cross-sectoral 
linkage is also gaining momentum, marrying together data from two or more 
disciplines, simultaneously linking, for example, datasets pertaining to social care, 
education and police information. 
Whilst the widespread adoption of data linkage has brought with it many benefits, it 
has also posed considerable challenges and has raised important ethical, legal and 
social questions, which must be accommodated within any regulatory approaches 
adopted.  The next section considers in turn some of the key challenges associated 
with this aspect of health research regulation and the different functions which 
principles can play in addressing these. It becomes apparent that reliance on rules 
alone can be particularly problematic from a regulatory perspective and the 
complimentary roles which principles can play in tending to these challenges is 
highlighted. As mentioned from the outset, one of the purposes of this paper is to 
explore the continuum upon which principles and rules can co-exist but with a focus 
on principles, given their particular prominence within regulation. Thus, whilst the 
strengths of principles and the limitations of rules are considered below, it should not 
be taken that rules are viewed as unhelpful for regulatory purposes. On the contrary, 
rules fulfil indispensable roles within regulation. However, for the purposes of the 
present discussion, the limelight is on principles and thus discussion reflects this.  
3.1 Where there are tensions which exist within the law e.g. limiting, restricting, 
banning and promoting behaviour all at the same time – principles can offer us an 
interpretive /guiding function 
Lyria Bennett Moses has commented on the challenges faced by the law in keeping up 
with technological change and has identified the need for the law to limit, restrict, ban 
and encourage behaviour as one of these key challenges. 72 The introduction of new 
technologies associated with data reuse has triggered the need to both restrict and at 
the same time encourage the sharing and use of data for research purposes. This is 
because health information contained within electronic health records (EHRs) can be 
considered to be particularly “sensitive” in nature and at the same time, as outlined 
above, it is particularly valuable for research purposes. 
With regards to the need to restrict the use of personal information, information 
pertaining to an individual’s personal or mental health is defined as “sensitive 
personal data” within the UK Data Protection Act 1998, embodying the same notion 
from the European Data Protection Directive.73 The use of sensitive personal data for 
research purposes gives rise to important considerations including issues around 
privacy, consent and the public and private interests in research. Even where data are 
anonymised or pseudonymised so as to greatly reduce the risk of re-identification and 
                                                
71 At a European level, the European Medicines Agency has established ENCePP (the European 
Network of Centres for Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacovigilance) ‘to further strengthen the post-
authorisation monitoring of medicinal products in Europe’ European Network of Centres for 
Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacovigilance, “What is ENCePP?” (2015) available at 
www.encepp.eu/structure/index.shtml (accessed 7th January 2015).  
72 See note 12 above.  
73 Data Protection Act 1998, chapter 29, Part 1, Section 2(e). 
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resultant harms, some risk of re-identification still remains.74 Further, regardless of 
the risks of re-identification, some uses of data may be deemed inappropriate 
nonetheless, particularly where excessive commercial profit may result 75 or where the 
research question may be deemed contrary to the public interest.76 At the same time, 
the public and private interests in conducting data linkage studies i.e. the research 
findings and subsequent health improvements that they can yield are widely 
acknowledged.77 Thus, the regulatory environment governing data reuse is 
particularly complex; it must both protect against unlawful uses and at the same time 
facilitate ethical and lawful research purposes.  
It has been well established within the literature that the current state of play in terms 
of how the reuse of EHRs for research is governed is unsatisfactory in terms of 
achieving this balance.78 Particular challenges pertain to understandings of how 
different pieces of legislation, i.e. different rules, are to be interpreted and how they 
might interact with other relevant rules. Further challenges relate to how such rules 
are to be applied to different data related activities. Indeed, how electronic data and 
biological samples might be linked together and how such activities should be 
governed is an increasing area of interest.79  
The European Data Protection Directive, for example, represents just one body of 
rules and yet it must govern a wide range of activities related to uses of data and it 
must accommodate a wide variety of interests. The Directive provides legal rules for 
how personal data may and may not be used across the European Union. Additionally, 
it prescribes when and how such data can be shared beyond the Union’s Member 
States. The Directive must not only govern on issues around how data may or may not 
be used for health research purposes, but it also includes provisions on, for example, 
data uses for online consumer services, social media and third country transfer of 
data. These are very different goals and yet one set of rules is relied upon.  
                                                
74 See for example: P Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization” (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701 – 1777; S Fullerton et al., “Meeting the 
governance challenges of next-generation biorepository research”, (2010) 2 Science Translational 
Medicine (commentary); and The Royal Society, ‘Science as an Open Enterprise’ (2012) The Royal 
Society Science Policy Centre report 02/12. 
75 S Davidson, C McLean, S Treanor et al., 'Public Acceptability of Data Sharing Between the Public, 
Private and Third Sectors for Research Purposes', Scottish Government Social Research Series (APS 
Group Scotland, 2013). 
76 Ibid, at 88.   
77 See for example R Lyons et al., “Use of Data Linkage to Measure the Population Effect of Non-
health-care Interventions” (2014) 383 The Lancet 1517-1519.  
78 For general overviews, see: Academy of Medical Sciences, Personal data for public good: using 
health information in medical research (2011); Academy of Medical Sciences, A new pathway for the 
regulation and governance of health research (2012); R. Thomas and T. Walport, Data Sharing Review 
Report (2008); G. Laurie and N. Sethi, “Information Governance of Use of Health-Related Data in 
Medical Research in Scotland: Current Practices and Future Scenarios.” (University of Edinburgh 
School of Law Working Paper No 2011/26, 2011). 
79 For an interesting article discussing regulatory challenges around tissue and data see: G Laurie and S 
Harmon, “Through the Thicket and Across the Divide: Successfully Navigating the Regulatory 
Landscape in Life Sciences Research” in E Cloatre & M Pickersgill, (eds.) Knowledge, Technology and 
Law (Routledge, 2014) 121-136.  See also the work of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics dedicated 
Working Party on Biological and Health Data (2015) available at 
http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/background-project/ (accessed 6th Jan 2015).  
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Rules can prescribe specific acts in a given scenario,80 often by virtue of their 
applicability in an “all or nothing” fashion: “if the facts a rule stipulates are given, 
then either the rules is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or 
it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.” 81 Though, frequently, 
uncertainty can arise regarding the applicability of rules as is the case with data 
protection legislation. Furthermore, by virtue of their ‘open texture’82 different 
interpretations can arise out of the same rules. This can be demonstrated by the fact 
that different EU Member States have varied in their interpretation of the Directive. 83  
This is not to imply that rules are not necessary or important; rules can help decision-
makers when those rules are clearly drafted and when relevant principles are 
inherently reflected within those rules. Consider the duty to promote ethical research 
which has been explicitly laid out within the recently passed Care Act 2014. Section 
111(2) of the Act introduces a legal obligation to actively encourage and facilitate 
safe and ethical research: 
 In performing the duty under subsection (1), a person must have regard to the 
 need— 
 (a)to protect participants and potential participants in health or social care 
 research and the general public by encouraging research that is safe and 
 ethical, and 
 (b) to promote the interests of those participants and potential participants  and 
 the general public by facilitating the conduct of such research.84 
Whilst the explicit reference to a duty to facilitate research is very much welcomed, 
explicit provisions encouraging data sharing for research are often lacking within the 
various legislative instruments governing data use.  Often, decision-makers are left 
without any clear direction on how to address the conflicting tensions that can arise 
within legislation. Principles can help to tend to the conflicting demands being placed 
upon regulatory environments. Because conflicting demands give rise to confusion, 
principles fulfil an important role in supporting the interpretation of rules, and 
consequently, of guiding action.85 Principles can shed light for decision-makers as to 
the meaning to be accorded to rules. 
Within bioethics literature in particular, principles have been both championed for 
their action-guiding quality86 and equally, they have been criticised for lacking this 
quality. Principlism - arguably the most dominant ethical framework within Western 
                                                
80  Braithwaite, note 24 above, at 51. 
81 See note 2 above. 
82 See note 1 above. 
83 See for example: European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment” 
Brussels, 25.01.2012, (SEC2012) 72 final (p. 13); N. Robinson et al., ‘Review of the European Data 
Protection Directive’ Technical Report Sponsored by the Information Commissioner’s Office, RAND 
Europe, (2009) ICO; Privacy in Research Ethics & Law (PRIVIREAL) Project. Retrieved 7 April 
2014, www.privireal.org. 
84 Section 111(2) Care Act 2014.	  
85 See T Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995) at 719. 
86 Beauchamp and Childress, note 7 above. 
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bioethics - is a principle-based approach to decision making. The Four Principles, as 
they are often referred to, include justice, beneficence, non-maleficence and 
autonomy.87 Beauchamp and Childress, the first proponents of Principlism, offer this 
approach as a means to resolving ethical dilemmas and in determining which course 
of action to take to resolve the dilemma. Some suggest that despite methodologies 
advanced for applying principles, such as specification, subsumption, and balancing,88 
normative principles will still give rise to conflict and disagreement around how such 
principles should be interpreted and applied in order to resolve dilemmas89 and how 
precisely, they are to guide action.90 Vagueness91 of principles and their tendency to 
“prescribe highly unspecific acts”92 represent enduring flaws for many critics.93  
It is argued here that such criticisms whilst to some extent valid, are myopic. Such 
perspectives fail to acknowledge two important points. The first point is that 
principles are designed to guide rather than prescribe action. The reality of difficult 
decision-making is such that clear-cut answers about what to do are not always 
apparent after rules have been applied (in those circumstances where rules apply).  It 
is not the telos of principles to prescribe highly specific actions, but to chaperon 
decision-makers around considerations which should be included within any 
deliberations about which action to take. The fact is that legislation (and rules 
included within it) gives rise to uncertainty around “what to do”. Critics of principles 
tend to overlook discretion as a necessary and important component of decision-
making.  
Discretion implies that judgment around which interpretation to give a principle (or 
even a rule, in some instances), and determination of the action which should follow, 
ultimately lies with the decision-maker. In the context of data reuse for research, 
ultimate responsibility for determining “the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data” lies with Data Controllers.94 Decision-making, by its very nature, 
demands discretion. Principles, by their very nature, implicate discretion. What those 
who criticise principles on the basis of a lack of provision of specific action guiding 
content fail to see is the inevitability, value, and necessity of discretion. 
Discretion is an inevitable element of the vast majority of decision-making, even 
where rules are involved.  It is impossible to legislate for or to foresee every single 
                                                
87 Ibid. 
88 Richardson, note 20 above; Beauchamp and Childress, note 7 above.  
89 For discussion on the four principles from the perspective of ‘doing’ medical ethics, see R Gillon, 
“Defending the four principles approach as a good basis for good medical practice and therefore for 
good medical ethics”, 41 Journal of Medical Ethics (2015) 111-116. 
90 O O’Neill, “Applied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public Policy” (2009) 26 Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 219-230, at 223. 
91 C Diver, “Regulatory Precision” in K Hawkins and J Thomas (eds), Making Regulatory Policy (Uni 
of Pittsburgh, 1989) 200. 
92 Raz, see note 3 above. 
93 For a broader critique of the Four Principles, see for example, R Rhodes, “Good and not so good 
medical ethics” (2015) 41 Journal of Medical Ethics 71-74. 
94 Article 2(d), Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data. 
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possible eventuality, thus, there will be many situations for which a rule is not 
provided; “no system of rules is capable of covering all new cases that might 
eventually arise”. 95 Likewise, poor drafting may imply conflict between different 
rules, rendering uncertainty about which rule should apply in a given situation. One of 
the key strengths of principles is their flexibility and their adaptivity which means that 
they can be called upon in situations where discretion must be drawn upon. This will 
be the case particularly in regards to the regulatory environment governing data use  
where certain uses must be restricted and others promoted, and the distinction is not 
always clear. If we make peace with these two realities about principles, then we can 
appreciate them for the helpful regulatory tools that they are. 
A set of guiding principles can ensure that all actors to which those principles apply 
conduct themselves (and thus take action) according to the spirit of the regulatory 
landscape within which their activities are governed. Consider, for example, the 
Caldicott Principles96 and the recently introduced seventh Caldicott Principle which 
stipulates that “The duty to share information can be as important as the duty to 
protect patient confidentiality”.97 Principles can thus be used both to discourage 
inappropriate data sharing and to encourage the safe, ethical sharing of health 
information for health research.98  
 
3.2 Principles can assist in supporting genuine dialogue with stakeholders and 
publics 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 established the Health and Social Care 
Informatics Centre (HSCIC) in England. Through the General Practice Extraction 
System (GPES), information would be extracted from general practice patient-
identifiable health data and made available in the HSCIC for research purposes. This 
endeavour is known as the “care.data” initiative and has caused considerable 
controversy within the UK, for the most part, due to a lack of engagement with the 
public and the reliance upon an opt-out system when the public felt they were not 
adequately informed about the initiative in the first place. 99 The care.data debacle 
illustrated so clearly the importance of openness and transparency before the 
introduction of new regulatory approaches to new technologies. The mere fact that 
HSCICs were set up through legislative provisions did not necessarily provide 
                                                
95  A Amaya, ‘Virtue, Legal Reasoning, and Legal Ethics’, Presentation given to University of 
Edinburgh Legal Theory Research Group (20th June 2012). 
96 Department of Health, Information: To Share or not to Share? The Information Governance Review’, 
2013. 
97 Ibid, at 21. 
98 G Laurie and N Sethi, “Towards Principles-Based Approaches to Governance of Health-Related 
Research Using Personal Data” (2013) 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation 43-57. 
99 PwC, ‘Data Release Review’, Health and Social Care Information Centre,  2014 available at 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/14246/HSCIC-Data-Release-Review-PwC-Final-
Report/pdf/HSCIC_Data_Release_Review_PwC_Final_Report.pdf  (accessed 11 July 2014); 
‘Careless.data’, Nature (editorial)  507, 7 (06 March 2014) doi:10.1038/507007a;  B Goldacre, 
‘Care.data is in chaos, It breaks my heart’, Comment in The Guardian, 28 February 2014 available at : 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/28/care-data-is-in-chaos (accessed 24 April 
2014). 
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legitimacy for their existence.100 This is an example of where rules fail, the fact that 
provisions were made within the Health and Social Care Act 2012 for certain data 
uses to occur was not enough; rules, without value engagement, are worthless.  Where 
principles can begin to help is in providing a means to facilitate dialogue between all 
relevant stakeholders within a regulatory landscape. 
Principles can engender “an effective form of communication which facilitates 
ongoing moral debate and ongoing reflection”.101 Within bioethics, principles are 
invoked continuously as the basis upon which to formulate argumentation and with 
which to support (or oppose) a particular approach when considering ethical 
dilemmas. Consider the Journal of Medical Ethics Festschrift edition102 in 2003 which 
was dedicated to Raanon Gillon, one of Principlism’s foremost advocates. In this 
special edition, four scenarios presenting ethical dilemmas103 were debated from 
different perspectives and principles were invoked throughout in order to 
communicate the different articulations of how the related dilemmas should be 
resolved. Principles such as justice, beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, 
solidarity, altruism are commonly invoked within discussions around health research 
regulation, they provide a common language with which to explore and prioritise 
different concerns: principles provide “a basic moral language and a basic moral 
analytic framework.”104  
Furthermore, principles can develop and evolve in order to reflect changes within the 
status quo. We can consider the principle of autonomy which has come to occupy an 
ever-expanding space within bioethical discussions. One manifestation of this can be 
seen within the “fetishisation” of consent which has come to dominate health 
research.105 This “fetishisation” has in turn provoked debate, with discussions 
emerging around the limitations on consent, particularly in practical terms in settings 
such as research using EHRs.106  
Depending upon the methodology employed, the process of drafting a set of guiding 
principles to be read alongside legislation can be a very inclusive and iterative process 
whereby key stakeholders are consulted and engaged. Their viewpoints can in turn be 
reflected within key principles. Indeed one of the key criticisms of care.data was the 
                                                
100 P Carter, G Laurie, M Dixon-Woods, “The social licence for research: why care.data ran into 
trouble” (2015) 41 British Medical Journal, 401-409.  
101 W Van der Berg and F Brom, “Legislation on ethical issues: towards an interactive paradigm” 
(2000) 3 Ethical Theory Moral Practice 57-75.  
102 Festschrift edition of the Journal of Medical Ethics, (2003) 29:5.  
103 These four scenarios are often invoked within bioethical discussions. They include: the “standard” 
Jehovah’s Witness case, the “standard” child of a Jehovah’s Witness case, selling kidney’s for 
transplantation and genetic manipulation and germline enhancement. 
104 O’Neill, see note 90 above. 
105 See for example, G Laurie, “Evidence of Support for Biobanking Practices” (2008) 337 British 
Medical Journal 186-187; G Laurie and E Postan, “Rhetoric or Reality: What is the Legal Status of the 
Consent Form in Health-Related Research?” (2012) Medical Law Review 1- 44. 
106 K. El Emam and L. Arbuckle, Anonymizing Health Data, (USA: O’Reilly Media, 2013); E. Regidor, 
“The use of personal data from medical records and biological materials: ethical perspectives and the 
basis for legal restrictions in health research” (2004) 54 Social Science and Medicine 1975-1894, at 
1976; P Furness and L Nicholson, “Obtaining Explicit Consent for the Use of Archival Tissue 
Samples: Practical Issues” (2004) 20 Journal of Medical Ethics 561 – 564.  
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lack of engagement with the public. Perhaps, if the time had been taken to 
meaningfully engage with the public before launching the initiative, the current delay, 
scandal and inevitable perpetuation of suspicion around “Big Data” might have been 
avoided. In fact, current consultation is taking place - in response to the backlash - for 
the establishment of Accredited Safe Havens which may be because of the damage 
caused by lack of engagement.107 
Principles can thus be used as a platform and common framework108 through which 
stakeholders can agree upon the values and considerations to be included within 
regulatory approaches. Principles can also be used as a way of communicating the 
different interests which are at stake. Within care.data, there is a clear tension around 
public and private interests in health research. Principles are more conducive to 
supporting genuine dialogue with stakeholders and publics, since they do not 
prescribe (in the way that rules can) what specifically ought to be done. They promote 
reflection precisely on this point, through engaging in dialogue and, in particular, they 
offer us the opportunity to layout the core values which matter to us in the specific 
context.  Rules, in contrast, can do the opposite, they can either prohibit something 
that might not be problematic or, as in the case of care.data grant licence where there 
is little.109 
 
3.3. Principles can protect us against over/under-inclusiveness of activities which 
rules can proliferate especially when we are dealing with manifestly clear 
underlying values  
Another challenge regarding law and technological progress as identified by Bennet-
Moses is that legislation can tend to be over/under inclusive of activities: 
“Technological change aggravates problems of targeting. New artefacts, activities and 
relationships may fall within a rule despite their being irrelevant to its goals, or may 
fall outside it despite a clear connection”. 110 In considering what over and under-
inclusiveness mean, Bennet-Moses first reminds us that rules, as manifested within 
laws, are drafted with one or several particular goals in mind; “usually the rule-maker 
hopes that if people act in accordance with the rule, some goal will be achieved”. 111 
In the case of the European Data Protection Directive, for example, two key goals 
informed its drafting (and these goals remain the same for the draft Regulation); 
 The centrepiece of existing EU legislation on personal data protection, 
 Directive 95/46/EC3, was adopted in 1995 with two objectives in mind: to 
 protect the fundamental right to data protection and to guarantee the free flow 
 of personal data between Member States.112  
                                                
107 R Ramesh, ‘NHS medical records to be stored in regional data centres’, (2014) The Guardian, 
available http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/07/care-data-patient-information-
accredited-safe-havens (accessed 8th Oct 2014). 
108 N. Daniels, “Accountability for Reasonableness” (2000) 321 British Medical Journal 1300 – 1301.  
109 Carter et al., see note 100 above. 
110 See note 12 above, at 39. 
111 See note 12 above, at 35. 
112  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
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A balance must be achieved then, in both ensuring adequate protection to the privacy 
of data subjects whilst simultaneously facilitating data-sharing. As has already been 
established above, in the context of EHRs and health research, achieving this balance 
has posed considerable challenges. In fact, the European Data Protection Directive – a 
key body of rules governing reuse of data - has been under revision since January 
2012. The Directive is now somewhat out-dated. It was drafted at a time when the 
Internet, for example, was at a nascent stage.113 As with so many new technologies, 
the scope and pace at which the Internet would proliferate was not foreseen. Consider 
the extent to which social media sites such as Facebook have progressed in their use 
of personal data, broader technological developments in data analytics and the fact 
that third country transfer of data outside of the EU is becoming increasingly 
prevalent.114  
The practical realities around how data are used have outgrown the Directive, with 
widespread acceptance that the Directive is no longer fit for purpose 115 and in some 
aspects of being either over or under inclusive of the various data-related activities 
which have proliferated since the Directives initial inception. What has resulted has 
been the proposal of a new General Data Protection Regulation116which has raised 
significant concerns from the scientific community when considered against the 
realities of using EHRs in research. The particular problems that the new Regulation 
might bring have been discussed at length elsewhere 117 and given the state of flux 
and perpetual toing and froing of versions of the Draft between the European Council, 
Parliament and Commission, focussing on any particular provisions is unnecessary for 
present purposes. Rather, the point to make is that in the same way that the European 
Data Protection Directive has become outdated and under/over-inclusive in some 
respects, the Regulation is likely to suffer a similar fate in due course: we simply 
cannot foresee and therefore we are unable to provide rules for every possible 
eventuality in the future, such is the nature of relying upon rules. Innovation will not 
cease, technological development will continue and new technologies, including 
novel methods for using and analysing data to harness benefits for health research will 
also continue. Furthermore, the insights which can be yielded from linking electronic 
data and biological samples as well as health and non-health data are also 
                                                                                                                                       
(General Data Protection Regulation) 25.1.2012 COM (2012) 11 final (Explanatory Memorandum, 
Para 1). 
113 European Parliament, ‘Q&A on EU data protection reform’, 4th March 2014. Retrieved 29 March 
2014,www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/background/20130502BKG07917/20130502BKG079
17_en.pdf.  
114 For discussion see: M. Birnhack, “The EU Data Protection Directive: An engine of a global 
regime”, (2008) 24 Computer Law & Security Review 508–520; P. Schwartz, “European Data 
Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flow” (1995) 80 Iowa Law Review 471 – 496.  
115 For an overview of the changing landscape, see N Robinson et al, ‘Review of EU Data Protection 
Directive, Inception Report’, RAND Europe (2008). 
116 Note 112 above. 
117 M. Ploem and K. Stronks, “Proposed EU data protection regulation is a threat to medical research” 
(Editorial), (2013) 346 British Medical Journal f3534; R. Fears et al., “Data protection regulation and 
the promotion of health research: getting the balance right”, (2014) 107 Quarterly Journal of Medicine 
3–5. 
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considerable.118 Cross-sectoral data-sharing is also an increasingly important area of 
data use.119  And yet such research is considerably impeded at present in part due to 
significant regulatory hurdles. Health research, for example, is prioritised within 
legislation 
Directives offer some leeway with regards to how Member States interpret them. The 
fact that a Regulation is being proposed in contrast to the pre-existing Directive, 
means that, in the absence of a set of companion principles, there will be less room for 
interpretation and thus limited capacity to enact the rules included within the 
Regulation in a way which is consistent with the important goal of facilitating health 
research. Granted, the divergent interpretations of Member States with regards to the 
pre-existing Directive have led to fragmented approaches to data sharing, however, it 
can also be argued that this could be attributed to the fact that clear guiding principles 
around data sharing for research purposes are not included alongside the Directive.  
An obvious rebuttal to this point would be that there are 8 Data Protection Principles 
included within the European Data Protection Directive but the question arises as to 
whether these are  “principles” per se or a set of high-level rules which are in 
themselves, manifestations of underlying principles. This is a clear example of the 
interconnectedness and ‘grey-area’ of rules and principles, where high-level rules may 
indeed be more ‘principle-like’. Arguments can be made for referring to the Data 
Protection Principles as either rules or principles. If they are to be considered 
principles, then this is supported by the fact that discretion lies around for example, 
how one interprets, what constitutes “appropriate technical measures”120as included in 
the seventh principle. At the same time, it could be argued that the “principles” are 
not a set of ethical considerations to guide decision-makers around “what to do”, 
rather, they are a set of prescriptive rules (albeit incorporating some loose 
terminology which is open to interpretation) which can either be satisfied or not. The 
non-observation of the principles can lead to infringement of the Directive. It is the 
authors opinion that in this particular instance, the Data Protection Principles are 
treated more so as rules, than principles.   
The nature of principles is such that they provide us with a reminder of the different 
underlying values which must be factored-in to the decision-making process around 
“what to do” rather than telling us explicitly. As alluded to above, linking data from 
health and non-health sources has great potential to expand our understanding of 
health and wellbeing. Yet, there has been a focus within regulatory terms on 
prioritising health uses (and even here, regulatory impediments are rife). Thus, within 
the UK, attempts are being made to map out how health and non-health related 
                                                
118 In fact, at the time of writing, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics is conducting a consultation on this 
very topic, see Nuffield Council on Bioethics, “Consultation on the linking and use of biological and 
health data” available http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/project-information/ 
(accessed 8 Jan 2015). 
119 Reflected by the recent Scottish Government Consultation: S Davidson et al., “Public Acceptability 
of Cross Sectoral Data Linkage: Deliberative Research Findings” (2012). 
120 The seventh data protection principle reads: “Appropriate technical and organisational measures 
shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss 
or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.” UK Data Protection Act, 1998. 
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research which relies on ready access to electronic data can be joined up. 121 For the 
reasons outlined in this paper, and which have been argued by this author and others 
in more detail elsewhere, 122principles can be of real value in helping to avoid the 
over/under-inclusiveness of activities that can result from relying upon rules alone. In 
particular, principles as a  
pre-determined, clear set of values can compensate for the gaps in the law 
where a clear course of action for the situation at hand is not 
offered….principles offer flexibility and guidance where provisions are not 
provided within the law.123 
Thus, within the Scottish context, a set of Guiding Principles, bolstered by Best 
Practice instances has been developed in the Scottish Health Informatics Programme, 
endorsed by the Scottish Information Commissioner’s Office and adopted by the 
Scottish Government in its Data Linkage Framework.124   
 
3.4. Principles can safeguard against abuse of powers or of purposeful mis-
interpretation of rules 
Principles can also offer a means of safeguarding against abuse of powers,125 as well 
as abuse of the law, thus playing a protective role within a regulatory environment. A 
useful example can be found in the oft-cited case of Riggs v Palmer.126 In that 
particular case, having murdered his grandfather in order to prevent any changes 
being made in his will, a grandson (Elger Palmer) sought to claim his grandfather’s 
inheritance early. Had the relevant legal rule been applied to the case, the grandson 
would have been punished for murder, but he would also still have received his 
inheritance. Acknowledging the injustice of such an outcome, Judge Robert Early 
argued that in permitting the grandson to access the inheritance, “the tenets of 
universal laws and maxims would be violated”.127 Thus, in departing from the 
relevant legal rules, the principle of not being allowed to profit from your own fraud 
was invoked and Palmer was not allowed to benefit from the inheritance. This 
example demonstrates some important points for the current discussion.  
First, it can be argued that the myopic nature of rules can give razor-sharp but very 
narrow focus on a situation. Thus what is needed is a more holistic view of the Law 
                                                
121 See, for example both the Farr Institute of Health Informatics Research at 
http://www.farrinstitute.org/ and the Administrative Data Liaison Service http://www.adls.ac.uk/ 
accessed 6th Jan 2015.  
122 N Sethi, “The Promotion of Data Sharing in Pharmacoepidemiology” (2014) 21 European Journal 
of Health Law 271-296. See also note 82 above and N Sethi and G Laurie, “Delivering proportionate 
governance in the era of eHealth: Making linkage and privacy work together”, (2013) 13 Medical Law 
International 168-204. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Guiding Principles for Scottish Government Data Linkage Framework, endorsed by the Scottish 
Information Commissioner’s Office at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/11/9015 
(accessed 7 Jan 2015). 
125 See for example Braithwaite, note 24 above.  
126 Riggs v. Palmer (1889) 115 N.Y. 506. 
127 Ibid. 
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which is a system founded on core values. Principles, as suggested above, embody 
those values and underpin all specific instances of applications of rules. Thus, 
principles play an essential role in reminding the decision-maker of deeper and 
broader values at stake, and which should not be compromised for the sake of a rigid, 
unreflective application of a “rule”. Principles can thus help to safeguard against 
abuse of rules. This is not to say that principles are not open to manipulation,128 
however it has been acknowledged that rules engender manipulation and thus are 
open to abuse more so than principles. 129130 
Consider the more contemporary example of “creative compliance”, a term which has 
reached prominence particularly within the regulation of the financial sector where it 
is described as the use of “…creative techniques which can be argued to be “perfectly 
legal”, despite the fact that they undermine the whole purpose of financial reporting, 
and its regulation.”131 132The Economic and Social Research Council has noted that 
the practice of creative compliance is not restricted to the financial sectors; “it poses a 
fundamental challenge to the effectiveness of public policy and the rule of law in all 
arenas where the regulated have the sophistication and resources to employ it”;133 
more particularly, the health research setting is not immune from it.  
Numerous examples of the protective function of principles which are more specific 
to the health research context can be found in the various international codes and 
declarations which are adopted within the scientific community. In addition to the 
Nuremburg Code mentioned earlier, the Declaration of Helsinki134 includes a set of 
ethical principles that have endured (with minor amendments) as foundational 
principles in guiding medical research on humans since their initial introduction in 
1964. It is “the fundamental document in the field of ethics in biomedical research 
and has influenced the formulation of international, regional and national legislation 
and codes of conduct.”135 These, and many additional sets of principles have been 
introduced in order to protect research participants and patients during research,136 
where new technologies (including new procedures) are carried out. The fact that 
                                                
128 D McBarnet. Regulation, Responsibility and the Rule of Law: Full Research Report ESRC (2007) 
End of Award Report, RES-051-27-0031. Swindon: ESRC. 
129 D McBarnet and C Whelan, “The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal 
Control” (1991) 54 Modern Law Review 848-873. 
130 See for example note 24 above..  
131 Economic and Social Research Council, Shaping Society, ‘Regulation, Responsibility and the Rule 
of Law’, available at: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-esrc/grants/RES-051-27-0031/read accessed 5th 
October 2014. 
132 For an interesting overview of Rules and Principles-based approaches discussed against the 
backdrop of accounting, see The Institute of Chartered Accountants for Scotland, ‘Principles not Rules: 
A Question of Judgement’ (2006). 
133 McBarnet, note 128 above. 
134 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects (2013). 
135 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (2002). 
136 See most recently, D Mascalzoni et al., “International Charter of principles for sharing bio-
specimens and data” (2014) European Journal of Human Genetics 1-8. 
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principle-based approaches have been adopted supports the idea that it is neither 
possible nor desirable to legislate on every aspect of conduct within a given 
regulatory environment. This can already be seen given the common accusation of the 
law’s inability to keep up with the pace of technological change and principles can 
fulfil an important function in helping to limit the possibilities of exploiting gaps in 
legislation which may lead to questionable practices merely due to a lack of specific 
legislation on ‘what to do’ when a new technology arrives. 
 
4. A final thought, principles alone are not enough 
We have considered above some of the important and different functions which 
principles can be called upon to perform for regulatory purposes. A final point to be 
made here is that the successful deployment of principles is reliant upon wider 
considerations beyond merely having relevant principles (and/or well drafted rules) to 
hand. It is also important that a given regulatory environment can facilitate a culture 
of confidence within it and support the observation/promotion/manifestation of 
relevant principles. Consider, for example, the public interest which, as mentioned 
above, is a central principle within the health research setting.  Whilst the public 
interest137 can be invoked in order to justify the reuse of health data for research 
purposes, the fact that it is ill-defined, and a “notoriously uncertain idea”138 combined 
with the reality of the related culture of caution surrounding the regulatory 
environment of data reuse, means that this important principle is seldom invoked.  
Similarly, engagement with key stakeholders within a regulatory environment is 
paramount to effective regulation. Indeed, Raab has stressed the need for a better 
understanding of:  
the motives, methods, values, ethics, and relationships that are found in 
situations where technology is invented or applied. Knowledge about these is 
the province of the human and social sciences; such knowledge is likely to 
help in seeing what can and should be regulated.139  
In the context of health research, working together with publics, including the general 
public, patients, researchers and data custodians, for example, in order to explore 
attitudes and concerns around how data are used within the research context140 should 
be prioritised. This can constitute a step beyond tokenistic engagement towards 
meaningful co-construction of regulatory approaches which can accommodate 
concerns from regulatees. Relatedly, trust plays a fundamental role within health 
research regulation. Within the context of data reuse, negative media coverage of data 
                                                
137 For discussion on public interest in the context of the Data Protection Act in particular, see G Black 
and L Stevens, “Enhancing Data Protection and Data Processing in the Public Sector: The Critical Role 
of Proportionality and the Public Interest” (2013) 10 SCRIPTed 93-122. 
138 M Taylor, Genetic Data and the Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), at 29. 
139 C Raab, “Regulating Surveillance: the importance of principles”, in K Ball et al, (eds.), Routledge 
Handbook of Surveillance Studies (Routledge, 2012), pp. 377-385 at 385. 
140 See for example P. Singleton et al., General Medical Council Public and Professional Attitudes to 
Privacy of Healthcare Data: A Survey of the Literature (Cambridge Health Informatics Limited, 2007). 
See: http://www.gmc 
uk.org/GMC_Privacy_Attitudes_Final_Report_with_Addendum.pdf_34090707.pdf (accessed 10th 
May 2013). 
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breaches and abuses (consider most recently the care.data debacle) can be very 
damaging to public acceptability of, 141 let alone confidence in, data uses.142This also 
speaks to a wider reported “mistrust” in science which has attracted much attention in 
recent years.143 Incorporating holistic regulatory approaches and governance 
mechanisms (including appropriate privacy, security, ethics and research procedures) 
can help us to take steps towards engendering trust and confidence in data reuses in 
research. As has been argued within this paper, principles not only remain 




This paper has proposed a reimagining of regulatory approaches towards health 
research regulation which centres on, as a first step, the development of a deeper 
understanding of some of the key functions which principles can perform as 
regulatory aids both independently, and in tandem with rules. It is only through 
“concious” use of principles, that we can get the most out of what they have to offer. 
The reuse of data for health research was offered in order to illustrate the particular 
strengths and capabilities of principles, particularly from the perspective of tending to 
some of the challenges which new technologies can pose for regulation. Finally, it has 
been acknoweledged that external regulatory considerations are also important in 
ensuring the successful deployment of principles. These elements include engendering 
a culture of confidence and engaging with and fostering trust with key stakeholders. 
This being said, a first step in reimagining regulatory approaches, as proposed here, 
can take us some of the way towards improving regulation. 
                                                
141 Davidson et al, see note 75 above. 
142 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 214, Data Sharing Between Public Bodies (2013); M 
Oswald, “An examination of trust, anonymisation and data sharing with particular reference to an 
exploratory research project investigating attitudes to sharing personal data with the public sector” 
(2014) 11 Scripted 245-272 and B. Goold, “Technologies of surveillance and the erosion of 
institutional trust” in K. Aas, Technologies of In Security: The Surveillance of Everyday Life (USA: 
Taylor & Francis, 2009) 207 -218, at 213. 
143 For an interesting discussion on public engagement and Science, see: B Wynne, “Public 
Engagement as a Means of Restoring Public Trust in Science – Hitting the Notes, but Missing the 
Music?” (2006) 9 Community Genet 211–220. 
 
